ship would have nearly three feet less water than she had in 1949, yet even the inbound transit was seen only possible on the highest tide of the year. What then the outbound transit with three feet less water?
The other limiting factor as early as twenty minutes before 'The Slack' was the remaining strength of the northeast-going stream, quite apart from the fact that we have no means of knowing when 'The Slack' is twenty minutes away. But in actual practice this latter point is academic, since all that can be done is to start the outward transit as soon as it is judged that the following stream has quietened sufficiently to be safely carried through. But this is by no means easy. You will be making that judgement west of the bridge in the knowledge that the tide will be running a lot harder once into the Swellies. But this is the function of the pilot, who, with his many years familiarity with the waterway in a wide diversity of conditions is best placed to be able to make that decision. In short, once the ship is in a position to be able to make the transit, time is no longer of any relevance, and the pilot will be watching the water - not his wristwatch !
4. The outward Transit - 14th April 1953.
As the day opened the 0600 Synoptic Chart showed a stationary deep depression west of Norway with a secondary low in the North Sea, and a High steadily closing the west coast of Ireland, compressing the area in between into what could be expected to be an increasingly strong northwesterly airstream. The chart shows that at 0600 the wind at Holyhead was already northwest force 5 (17-21 knots). But as the High continued its advance that wind continued to freshen throughout the morning. By 0800, as Conway was preparing to slip her mooring, on station off Point Lynus, Anglesey, the wind was being noted in the logbook of the Liverpool Pilot Boat as NW force 6 (22-27 knots),(Beaufort Wind Scale) while her noon entry has it as NW force 7 (28-33 knots).(Sub-Committee Report page 4) It was also a very unstable wind with Bidston Observatory recording gusts up to 49 knots (storm force 10). As we have seen in the section dealing with tides, these, together with the highest tide of the year, were exactly the conditions which could be expected to result in a strong Southwest Residual, producing an early reversal, short period of 'Slack', promptly followed by an unusually strong southwest-going stream. Conditions for the outward move could hardly have been more unpromising.
But in the shelter of the Plas Newydd mooring there was no indication of this. Capt. Durrant: "The early morning weather was fine and bright with a light northwesterly wind blowing across the strait. Conditions appeared ideal for the operation "Durrant P_3 line 16. Indeed at 0800, as the wind was being recorded by the Liverpool Pilot boat as NW Force 6, it was being recorded in Conway's Logbook as "N'ly force 1 to 2". But in its Report, the Investigating Sub-Committee were to comment later: "It is somewhat surprising to us that the party had no knowledge of the stormy conditions prevailing at sea at the time 'Conway' was to make the passage. Local knowledge may well have been that, under such circumstances, abnormal conditions might be encountered. It seems clear, from the time 'Conway' took to do six cables (9.23 to 10.10), that something very unusual was taking place, possibly a strong undercurrent which is known to occur in the channel .........."Sub-Com P_4 line 29 "Abnormal" is probably overstating it, and their use of the word "unusual" is more appropriate, but weren't they remarkably well informed about the Residual? There's no evidence to suggest that either Captains Goddard or Hewitt were even aware of its existance.
