In
attempting to summarise the factors which resulted in the 1953 loss, and
not necessarily in any special order, I would include :-
1.
The
scant and misleading tidal information on Capt
Goddard's chart which led to Capt. Hewitt fatally delaying "critical
point in the 'timetable'" until 0920 (L;pool - 1.58),(p_10)
or 20 minutes later than Pilot advised,(p_8a)
wth the result that the tow met the southwest-going 'Ebb' within minutes
of entering the Swellies.(p_8b)
2.
Unawareness
of the inherent dangers in attempting (even part of) a 20 minute outward
tow against 'The Ebb' on a big tide.(p_6)
(On the day this proved to be no answer to the perceived lack of water.)
3.
Over
dependancy on the theoretical, such as "the timing"(p_8c),
and a failure to address more practical issues such as the tideboard(p_13)
which would have both exposed the errors resulting from (1) above,
and would have made it obvious that the ship could have passed under
the bridge twenty minutes earlier like the Pilot wanted.
4.
Ignorance
of weather conditions at sea on the day,(p_7)
and a lack of awareness of its pronounced influence on both the strength,
and the height of the very unusual tides in the Menai Strait.(p_5)
Capt Hewitt would have been better advised to place more emphasis
on favourable weather than on the highest predicted tide. The
dominant feature that day was the the increased Southwest Residual(p_4)
generated by the very strong northwest wind at sea that morning,(Bidston)
which combined with an Extraordinary Spring tide(Ad_Tides)
to produce an unusually strong southwest-going stream(p_8d)
which quickly overpowered the tugs. That strong northwest wind would
also have left the tide significantly short of predicted levels. (Much
could have been learned from a more meaningful relationship with the
local pilots.)
But
the gravest mistake of all was the illusory vision of an ecxessively deep
ship at Plas Newydd, when that ship was so deep she barely had the water
on the highest of tides when the streams run at their hardest and when the
brief navigable 'slack water' period is at its shortest(p_3)
and quite out of context with the 20 minutes needed to tow the ship the
1500 metres between the two bridges.(p_6)
Delving into the facts forces the conclusion that mooring the ship at Plas
Newydd was an unrealistic impractical adventure doomed to failure from its
very conception. Sadly, although perhaps predictably, it did indeed prove
to be two bridges too far.
Capt. David G Williams (49-51)
21 years a First Class Pilot (Home & Overseas).Licenced for and fully experienced with all classes of ship up to and
including 100,000 tons.
The end of HMS Conway - 30th
October 1956
Footnote:
Nothing in this work is intended in any sense to be a criticism
of Captain Hewitt, who was presented with an impossibly difficult situation
well beyond the experience of the local pilots, and with only scant and
misleading information to guide him. Who among us can truthfully say that
he would have fared any better? Captain Hewitt's unenviable task was to
try to put right what had already been done, while those properly responsible
were never held to task. ..... D.G.W. (49-51)
